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**THE PROBLEM OF VERBALIZATION OF EMOTIONS IN THE LANGUAGE OF MORALITY:
LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS**

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Abstract

General linguistic turn in the philosophy of the XX th century provoked a thorough research interest in the peculiarities of the language of morality. In this heuristic context, there is a dominant tendency in modern philosophical discourse to refer to the language as to a phenomenon of being, and, in particular, moral being which is the subject of ethical knowledge. The nature of morality determines and constitutes significant difficulties for its verbal expression and categorical understanding in language constructions. However, the problem of the language of morality is not only to find an adequate linguistic form to express the imperative-evaluative content of a moral judgment, but also to understand which descriptive language (metalanguage) is the most acceptable for the interpretation of moral judgments. The criteria of this choice are the subject for a thorough analysis by various areas of the philosophical thought, logic, linguistics and psychology, which is the reason for the interdisciplinary research approach of the authors.

Keywords

Philosophy – Analytical philosophy – Ethics – Logic – Linguistics

The problem of verbalization of emotions in the language of morality: linguistic and philosophical aspects pág. 498

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Introduction

A lot of scientists exploring the topic of morality note that it is no longer possible to cast a role of the emotional component in making morally important decisions “due to” emotionalist revolution” happened at the turn of XX-XXI centuries. Emotions have been beyond the bounds of ethical research for a long time. It is related to the fact that “there is a difficulty and seeming impossibility of establishing the nature of emotions, ... but an “unstudied point” is not an absolute irrationality”; therefore, in our opinion, the study of the phenomenon of emotions will help to look differently at the motives of a moral conduct because hyper rationalized ethical theories founded on the Kantian model are not very successful in explaining this problem: they analyze the consequences rather than causes ignoring the psychological reality. In this regard, one has to understand the way we interpret the notion “emotions”, because a linguistic mistake often leads to a logical one and to the loss of a subsequent meaning of the language pattern. Further we need to find out whether the rationalization of emotions as reactions is possible, and then from the perspective of “understanding” the problem of the language of morality to identify the part of emotions in explaining morality: can “emotional judgments” occur?

Emotions and feelings: psycholinguistic differentiation

The notions “emotion and feeling” (emotion of shame, but feeling of love, feeling of justice, etc.) are frequently considered to be synonyms in the Russian literature. What separate meaning is supposed to be of each one?

First of all, the notion “emotions” is psychological; therefore, we will study the works of classic psychologists. The fundamental phenomenological description of emotions appeared in the S. L. Rubinstein’s works. The basis of the interpretation of emotions is human actions, experience and relationships. A human being does not act, he is emotional over what happens to him, and through the prism of the experiences relates to his surroundings. “The experience of this relation of a man to his surroundings constitutes the sphere of feelings or emotions. Human feeling is his attitude to the world, to what he experiences and does, in the form of direct experience”¹.

S. L. Rubinstein interprets the correlation of emotions and feelings as follows: “Genetically emotions were originally associated with instincts and desires. This connection is maintained, but it is incorrect to identify the human feelings with instinctive reactions and primitive instincts. The emotional sphere has been developing for a long time: from the primitive sensual, affective reaction of the animal to the higher human feelings. The human feelings are the feelings of a historical man”.²

The concept “affect” is also found in the works of the scientist. In the modern interpretation affect is a special kind of an emotional phenomenon, characterized by being strong and deep. Therefore, in this case it is not a mistake to correlate the philosophical concept “affect” rooted back in the Stoics with the contemporary concept “emotion”. Thus, S. L. Rubinstein doesn’t differentiate the two phenomena, feelings and emotions, and his point of view is supported by lots of scientists and not only psychologists.

¹ S. L. Rubinshtejn, *Osnovy obshchej psihologii* (SPb.: Piter 2007), 551.

² S. L. Rubinshtejn, *Osnovy obshchej psihologii*... 555.

The defining dictionary discovers the following interpretation of feelings: “persistent emotional relations of a person to the real world which reflect the significance of these phenomena in connection with human needs and incentives; the highest product of the development of emotional processes in the social conditions”³.

Feelings emerge after an emotional constituent: “they emerge after an emotional constituent in the ontogenesis; they are formed as individual consciousness develops influenced by the educational exposure of the family, school and art. Arising as a result of the generality of separate emotions, the developed emotions become the part of the human emotional sphere defining dynamics and the maintenance of situational emotional reactions”⁴.

Feelings represent a higher level of the spiritual development of a person: “the content of the dominant feelings of a person express his worldview attitudes, personality orientation, i.e. the most important characteristics of his individuality”⁵.

The dictionary definitions are substantial in this regard, as they represent the general understanding inherent in the scientific community. It is obvious that the notion “feeling” contains a philosophical connotative meaning to a greater extent than “emotion”. The dictionary records the emotional stability of the feeling and its connection with social and spiritual meanings. While the meaning of “emotions” is focused on the biological realities (instincts, reflexes, etc.), so that it explains the understatement of the role of emotions in morality.

The word “emotion” is of the Latin origin, so it is used in other languages. It remains to investigate whether the meaning and understanding of the term is the same in different languages. While examining the cultural specificity of the expressions of emotions in the Russian language, A. Vezhbickaya asks the following question, “Is the emotion a common concept for all people?”⁶

To answer the question the scientist refers to such European languages as German, French and Russian and finds the correspondences to the English word feeling (Germ. Gefühl, Fr. sentiment and Rus. чувство), but not to the English word “emotion”. These languages turn out to have no fully fledged equivalent for the English word “emotion”. Based on the studied approach A. Vezhbickaya concludes, “But if the notion “emotion” is a notion inherent in the Anglo-Saxon culture, it becomes quite clear that it is not applicable as a conceptual tool in the psychology of culture (as in any other)”⁷. The following conclusion comes further: “Emotion is a necessary word for the English language, and there is no reason to abandon it in the English-language discourse including the academic one. However, one has to be aware of the complexity and culturally determined specificity of this notion and to avoid it as a matter of course as a completely acceptable tool in studying another culture and psychology of various ethnic groups.

³ B. G. Meshcheryakova y V. P. Zinchenko, Bol'shoj psihologicheskij slovar' 3rd ed. (SPb.: Prajm-EVROZNAK, 2006), 602

⁴ B. G. Meshcheryakova y V. P. Zinchenko, Bol'shoj psihologicheskij slovar'... 602.

⁵ B. G. Meshcheryakova y V. P. Zinchenko, Bol'shoj psihologicheskij slovar' 3rd... 622.

⁶ A. Vezhbickaya, Yazyk. Kul'tura. Poznanie: Perevod s anglijskogo (Moscow: Russkie slovari, 1997), 389.

⁷ A. Vezhbickaya, Yazyk. Kul'tura. Poznanie: Perevod s anglijskogo, (Moscow: Russkie slovari, 1997), 389.

Moreover, if the notion “emotion” is a term specified by the Anglo-Saxon culture, “feeling” (or “to feel”) refers probably to the conceptual and lexical universals which can be regarded as a reliable foundation of cultural psychology”⁸.

A. Vezhbickaya remarks that “feelings” are associated with social and moral concern while “emotions” are associated with the internal state. The fact indicates the different status of universality of these notions: “to feel” (more than “emotion”) forms a common concept for all people and all human beings (including on the Ifaluk Atoll) associate “feelings” with ideas about what they say and do and what they consider as “good” or “bad”, personality and society” in their linguistic and cultural systems⁹.

This suggests that when we use the lexeme “emotion”, we may unwittingly refer to the psychological experience of the English culture where this notion (emotion) corresponds to the internal state absent in the psychological experience of another culture.

Thus, the notion “emotion” is used not only in psychology and cultural studies but also in ethics. It appears irrelevant for speakers of another linguistic consciousness with a different word to express a similar notion. This is about the word “feeling”. Here we are not talking about the way of making absolute of this aspect, but it would be mistaken to ignore it looking closely at the linguistic usage inherent in the canons of the native language and a part of the ethical theory.

Further let us consider the semantics of the English words “emotion” and “feeling” in detail to clarify their word usage. Let us turn to the dictionaries. New Webster Dictionary of the English Language¹⁰ (1989) gives us the following meanings of the word “emotion”:

- 1) an affective state of consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, or the like is experienced;
- 2) distinguished from the cognitive and volitional states of consciousness;
- 3) any of the feelings of joy, sorrow, fear, hate, love, or the like;
- 4) any agitated or intense state of mind, usu. with concurrent physiological changes;
- 5) that which brings about any intense state or feeling.

These definitions give us an opportunity to draw an important conclusion: firstly, “emotions” are states of consciousness; secondly, these states are different from cognitive and volitional; thirdly, these “intensified” states of consciousness with concurrent physiological changes. It is noteworthy that these affective states of consciousness are capable to cause physiological reactions but at the same time unrulled by will and mind.

⁸ A. Vezhbickaya, *Yazyk. Kul'tura. Poznanie: Perevod s anglijskogo* (Moscow: Russkie slovari, 1997), 389.

⁹ A. Vezhbickaya, *Yazyk. Kul'tura. Poznanie: Perevod s anglijskogo...* 391.

¹⁰ N. Webster. *New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language Encyclopedic Edition*. (New York: Lexicon Publications, Inc., 1989): 1149.

This points to the fact about the instinctive nature of emotions.¹¹ What is more important that “emotion” is also interpreted through “feelings” (joy, grief, fear, hatred, love, etc.). Based on this we can define “emotion” as a “strong feeling”.

Let us consider the meaning of the word feeling:

- 1) the sense of touch by which we perceive external objects which come in contact with the body;
- 2) the sensation conveyed by the sense of touch;
- 3) the act or power of feeling;
- 4) physical sensation other than that due to sight, hearing, taste, or smell;
- 5) mental sensation or emotion;
- 6) mental state or disposition;
- 7) consciousness;
- 8) impression;
- 9) opinion;
- 10) conviction;
- 11) tenderness of heart;
- 12) fine sensibility;
- 13) the quality of exciting or expressing emotion;
- 14) sensitiveness;
- 15) collective susceptibilities.

The semantic field of the notion “feeling” is obviously richer than the semantic space of the notion “emotion”. A greater number of ties of the notion “feeling” with the soul, spiritual and moral spheres are found rather than concerning the notion “emotion” (A. Vezhbitskaya focuses on this fact)

Let us turn to the dictionary of synonyms Word for Word in which we find such synonymous series of the meanings of the word “emotion”:

disposition, feeling, mood, sensation, sentiment;

ardour, fervor, passion, vehemence.

¹¹ The confirmation of the idea of E. Sepir about emotions as "instinctive sound emission", which do not participate in the semantic nature of the word.

The synonymous ranks of meanings of the word “feeling” are as follows:

consciousness, impression, perception, presentiment, sensation, sense;

air, atmosphere, aura, mood;

idea, notion, suspicion;

consensus, opinion, view;

affection, fondness, sentimentality, warmth;

emotion, fervor, passion;

compassion, empathy, sympathy, understanding.

The meanings of the words are apparently determined through each other. It indicates a close semantic identity of these words. However, there is no a complete identity between these words evidenced by the quantitative indicator of the word “feeling”, which is much larger than of the word “emotion”. Concurrently, it is an indicator of the semantic richness of this word, which can cause a greater number of associations and identifications as well as with the concepts of spiritual and moral properties (such components as presentiment, air, affection, fondness, compassion, empathy, sympathy, and understanding).

The semantic structure of the word “feeling” contains such components as compassion, empathy refers it to a moral terminology. It is also important that there is a semantic sequence of rational qualities (idea, notion) in the structure of the meanings of the word “feeling”, which indicates the conceptual philosophical potential of this word.

On the basis of the research conducted, we can make a conclusion that the word “feeling” is more philosophically convertible than the word “emotion”. This bears out the words of A. Vezhbitskaya about anglocentrism in psychology of the culture, which is most evident in the use of the term “emotion” in scientific linguistic, psychological and ethical research.¹² There is a manifestation of an “emotional determinism” in the studies because most linguistic philosophical research on moral consciousness has a significant psycho physiological and biological shift.

The fact mentioned above does not mean that it is not possible to find a reality corresponding to the English notion “emotion” in the moral experience of the Russian language consciousness. But the fact is that this reality will be biologized and psychologized, confirmed by the linguistic data of the word usage, which fix the unconscious associative work of language thinking, striving to identify “emotion” with unconscious, instinctive manifestations of the psyche.

¹² This can be judged by the names of the works themselves: Emotion and social theory; Emotion, truth and meaning; Emotion at work; Emotion and meaning in music; Action, emotion and will; Emotional Intelligence; Emotional-Cognitive Structuring: A New Theory of Mind; Cognition and Emotion; The Language of Emotion и т.д.

Despite this, contemporary linguistics is developing against psychological conclusions that have leveled the importance of the emotional component of the language. In this regard, at the beginning of the XXI century the Anglo-American philosophers decided to draw clear boundaries in the use of the notions “emotions” and “feelings”. So, R. Solomon became a kind of revolutionary pioneer investigating the matter. He initially demonstrated the original linguistic contradiction in the title of his work “True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us” issued in 2007 that he tried to eliminate in the content.

R. Solomon notes that “...the idea that an emotion is a feeling is not a simple matter of definition. It is a serious matter of theory and understanding with profound practical implications...”,¹³ that is why he “prefer to talk about emotional experience rather than simply “feelings,” which carries the implication of something simple and unstructured. The point, however, is that insofar as an emotion encompasses feelings those feelings include some sophisticated and subtly structured perceptions of the world. They also embody various evaluations or “appraisals”, and not just “oh, good!” and “that’s bad”... In other words, it is not that emotions are not feelings, but rather that what is meant by “feelings” includes all sorts of experiences that are by no means so simple as sensations”¹⁴.

Such reasoning supported by a large number of adherents in the ethical and philosophical circles made sense thanks to the discoveries in the field of empirical psychology, in particular the phenomenon of “emotional intellect”. Emotional intellect is the rationalization of emotions, the ability to manage them consciously. In the linguistics of emotions emotional intellect is understood as “... the ability to recognize one's own emotions, manage them, manifest them adequately and understand other people as well as people belonging to various cultures and of a different gender.”¹⁵ The studies have found that an emotional life is correlated with intellect because “there is no strict distinction between ratio and emotion”.¹⁶ Such discoveries allow us to have a new look at the problem of rationality of emotions, that is why it was necessary to determine and define the notion “emotion”, to identify its linguistic content in order to avoid hermeneutic interpretations in the study of the phenomenon of emotions in moral philosophy.

The specificity of the language of morality

Nowadays, the only structure of the reality reflection is the consciousness and the process of the information rationalization is the thinking. These two phenomena are not only interrelated to each other but also guarantee a proper and correct understanding of the world and the interaction among people. Unfortunately, the times of the rationalistic optimism are passing, giving way to the irrational skepticism about these phenomena, in terms of which there is the unjustified enthusiasm in the neopositivistic cultural paradigm. Without special considering the ethical-philosophical discourse of the consciousness, we can give an example of the opinion, accurately expressing the essence of the current situation: “...consciousness is such an object that fundamentally resists any attempt to

¹³ R. C. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us* (Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007), 139.

¹⁴ R. C. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings...* 141.

¹⁵ V. I. Shahovskij, *Emocii. Dolingvistika, lingvistika, lingvokul'turologiya* (Moscow: LIBROKOM, 2010), 116.

¹⁶ D. Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence. Why it can matter more than IQ* (Bantam Books, 1997), 75.

explain and understand it”¹⁷. The moral consciousness is naturally an object, falling under the metaphysical doubt about its ability to understand. Moreover, morality in its essence is one of the most mysterious manifestations of the human spirit. It shows that we should not only admire of this phenomenon, but also thoroughly analyze it, fully aware of the possible research boundaries. This raises the question of the adequate methodology for the moral consciousness research, and therefore, the thinking and the language as a rational expression of the reality, describing it. Furthermore, it is the psychological reality and the moral emotional behavior research that makes us look at the language of morality problem in a new way: “How can we explain the intuitively obvious practical effectiveness of morality?”¹⁸

So, the interest to the problem of the language of morality is renewed in the context of the linguistic turn in philosophy, creating a specific situation of the interest namely in the language. B. Markov writes: “The whole XX century is marked by a very thorough interest to the language and its careful use”. The language is revealed as an incredible, almost unknown object for thought: “The language has the widest range of meanings and assessments. The divine beginning and the mystery are seen in it. The language as a symbolic system conceals the mystery of the human consciousness and culture. Today the thesis “Everything is a language” is very popular”.¹⁹ German philosopher K. Apel remarks: “In the XXth century there is the clearest understanding that the word “language” indicates the main scientific and philosophical problems... the language becomes a common problem of almost all schools and disciplines (perhaps, the only common problem)”.²⁰ Experts believe that the leitmotif of his philosophy is the explanation of morality through “a communicative mutual understanding based on the intersubjective and linguistic commonalities”.²¹

A. Matar looks at the problem from a slightly different angle. He believes that at the end of the XIXth century, the traditional language model is replaced by another, “a modernistic model, predominantly created by writers, artists and poets. The modernistic language model becomes widely discussed, primarily due to the fact that it becomes the first principle put in a new language concept”.²² It opens new perspectives for research that have been previously unknown.

In these discussions, we see unanimity in understanding of the issue among the contemporary Russian and Western philosophers in regard to the philosophical attention paid to the language. However, such a keen interest in the language, strange as it may seem, is not quite a common situation for philosophy, because, as B. Bibikhin says: “Philosophers, thanks to whom we know what the philosophy is, have never raised a

¹⁷ D. V. Ivanov, “Soznanie kak ob"ekt metafizicheskikh issledovanij”, *Voprosy filosofii*, num 2 (2009): 96.

¹⁸ A. F. Vasil'ev, “Metaetika: obzor problematiki”, *Filosofskij zhurnal* Vol: 11 num 2 (2018): 176.

¹⁹ B. V. Markov, *Znaki bytiya* (SPb.: Nauka, 2001), 7.

²⁰ K.-O. Apel, *Transformaciya filosofii*. Transl.: V. Kurennoj, B. Skuratov (Moscow: Logos, 2001), 237.

²¹ L. I. Tetyuev, “Teoreticheskie osnovy etiki diskursa (Kant, Habermas, Apel)”, *Aktual'nye problemy filosofii i social'no-politicheskikh nauk* (Moscow: Izd-vo Vol'skogo voennogo instituta material'nogo obespecheniya (filial) federal'nogo gosudarstvennogo kazennogo voennogo obrazovatel'nogo uchrezhdeniya vysshego professional'nogo obrazovaniya «Voennaya akademiya material'no-tekhnicheskogo obespecheniya imeni generala armii A.V. Hruleva» Ministerstva oborony Rossijskoj Federacii, 2017), 85.

²² A. Matar, *Modernism and the language of philosophy* (London/New York: 2006), 166.

separate question about language”.²³ The thought and the language were a single element that was aimed at being. And if in this sphere it were possible to speak about something, then it would be about a contradiction of thinking and being (or about their unity), but not about a contradiction of the language to anything.

Analytically of the philosophical discourse produced by M. Heidegger makes us look at philosophy as something fundamentally different from other forms of culture, first of all, from science and religion.²⁴ This has contributed to the appeal to the language not only as a linguistic object of interest for linguistics, but also as a phenomenon of being (“the language is the home of being”). Not only the language as such, but the language of philosophy becomes the subject of the close analysis by various philosophical directions. Many ethical researchers see a certain limitation in a moral language research, which generally comes to the following: “Evaluation and imperative words and statements are taken as independent, “primary” objects of research - without taking into account the fact that these words and statements are backed by other realities - special evaluative and normative positions of people, that are internally experienced attitudes, motives, aspirations”²⁵.

The peculiarity of the language of morality is, first of all, that it is an emotionally loaded language. Emotions in the language of morality have a semantic function: they convey states (fear, joy, pity, etc.), interpreted psychologically, but are at the same time moral states. The difficulty is that these states may not have a verbal form at all, or have a form that contradicts the normative system of the language. The paradox here is that morality as a normative system requires an abnormal expression. The violation of the rules of morality does not coincide with the violation of the rules of the language; the correct use of the language does not guarantee the correctness of the moral action. In this sense, didactics, as the most common form of the moral imperative expression, turns out to be ineffective due to the fact that a correctly formulated moral requirement cannot ensure its understanding and execution. This problematizes the question of the truth of the moral judgment and the adequacy of its verbal (non-verbal) expression.

We consider that one of the specific features of the language of morality is its special subjunctive modality. A. Huseynov says about this: “Ethicians see in the language of morality mainly statements with “there” and “should” bindings, which are related to morality in one case with science and in the other case with law, and do not pay enough attention to the “would” (“as if”) binding, which sets the modality.”²⁶

The language of morality as a specific language, which is implemented at the level of professional texts, at the level of fiction, and the practice of everyday speech, has naturally become a subject of logical analysis. This is what deontological logic does, which, according to I. Gerasimova, is “a field of non-classical logic in which normative statements and related concepts are studied - necessarily, prohibited, solved and indifferently”.²⁷ As the researcher shows, the problems of normative reasoning have been

²³ V. V. Bibihin, *Yazyk filosofii* (SPb.: Nauka, 2007), 9.

²⁴ M. Heidegger, “Osnovnye ponyatiya metafiziki”, *Vremya i bytie: Stat'i i vystupleniya* (Moscow: Respublika, 1993).

²⁵ L. V. Maksimov, “Ob analiticheskom stile v etike”, *Eticheskaya mys'*, Moscow: IF RAN Vol: 18 num 1 (2018): 10.

²⁶ A. A. Guseynov, “Soslagaatel'noe naklonenie morali.” *Voprosy filosofii*, num 5 (2001): 3.

²⁷ I. A. Gerasimova, “Deonticheskaya logika i kognitivnye ustanovki”, *Logicheskij analiz yazyka: YAzyki etiki* (Moscow: YAzyki russoj kul'tury, 2000), 7.

studied by many philosophers, starting with Aristotle. The problems, causing the greatest difficulty, are the discrepancy between the truth and the falsehood of norms as the descriptions of orders. The issue of the relationship between deontological (axiological) and assertive statements (“must – exist”) is also noted as problematic.

The orientation of morality towards a certain abstract normality creates a discourse that is in opposition to the matter does not fit with the emotional moral behavior. The language of morality, as a language that appeals to the proper, is, to a certain extent, destructive for those spheres of life that are fully oriented towards being. It is most obviously manifested in such a practical sphere as business. Ethical discourse brings with it a problem where profit and success come first. American researchers discuss the destructive language of ethics: “Managers prefer to refrain from talking about morality, because these conversations are useless, because they do not contribute to the achievement of what managers want. And in some cases, such conversations are simply hostile to business pragmatism”.²⁸

The intension of the proper, which is the essence of morality, is expressed in the specific language constructions - moral maxima. The moral maximum as an evaluative judgment and as a form of knowledge is considered in a special study of V. Vasechko. The author makes such an interesting observation about the essence of moral maxima, which reveals the peculiarities of the language of the morality: “Moral maxima are dissolved in the human activity, penetrate it through, but are not, however, subject-sensibly localized”.²⁹

The imperative-evaluative function of moral maxima illustrates the omnipresence of the morality, which coercive character is formed by means of a special deontological logic, which contradicts the classical logic. There is a reason to believe that the emotional component in the structure of moral maxima is much more important than the rational one. Therefore, moral maxima are more often presented in the context of fiction, in which stylistic expressiveness serves as a semantic means.

The specificity of the language of morality is studied from the point of view of the logical analysis of the language, which is produced in very close contact with linguistics. The etymological analysis of the concepts of “due”, “essential” and “true” shows that in ancient cultural traditions (including Greek), the unity of the moral and ontological concepts is noted.³⁰ This syncretism indicates that a moral concept, and consequently a moral judgment, is a judgment of a special kind. The deontic component of the moral judgment can include a significant emotional component, which makes it difficult to analyze it logically and find an adequate rational form of expression.

The logical analysis of the language touches upon such different aspects of the language of the morality, including the emotional component as: the structure of sins and virtues (V. Gak); the concepts of “guilty” and “culpable” (O. Boguslavskaya); the meaning of the responsibility in the syntactic representation (L. Grigoryan); semantics of the guilt (E. Paduchev); the voice of the reason and the moral voice (E. Uryson); the concept of the

²⁸ R. Frederik y E. Petri, “Delovaya etika i filosofskij pragmatizm”, *Voprosy filosofii*, num 3 (1996): 74.

²⁹ V.Yu. Vasechko, *Moral'naya maksima kak fenomen poznaniya i kul'tury* (Ekaterinburg: Izd-vo Ural. un-ta, 2000), 56.

³⁰ I. A. Gerasimova, “Deonticheskaya logika i kognitivnye ustanovki”, *Logicheskij analiz yazyka: YAzyki etiki* (Moscow: YAzyki ruskoj kul'tury, 2000).

duty (A. Koshelev); concept of the purity (E. Yakovlev); semantics of the scrupulousness (A. Zaliznyak); ethics of the speech behavior in Russian culture (I. Makeeva), etc. In the course of these researches the panoramic vision of the features of syntagmatic and pragmatic levels of the existence of the language of morality in the language of daily and art culture develops. The language of morality has a number of specific characteristics that make it difficult to study its using traditional methods of the linguistic analysis. At the same time, everything that is obtained in the course of the linguistic analysis is invaluable for further philosophical comprehension of the morality.

L. Wittgenstein's position has a special place in the issue of the language of the morality³¹. The “ethical silence” that the philosopher introduced into the philosophy has risen some kind of a “philosophical scandal”, since this concept has produced a radical “reevaluation of values” in the field of the ethical thought, literally negating the work of a huge number of the theorists working in the field of the moral philosophy. Let us reproduce some well-known fragments of the logical-philosophical treatise to illustrate some ideas on ethics.

The philosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's views is usually the interpretation of them in the spirit of the analytical tradition, according to which the meaning of the philosophy is a logical analysis of the language (analytical criticism of the language). The preface contains quite definite analytical statements by the author: “The book discusses philosophical problems and shows that the setting of these problems is based on the lack of understanding of the logic of our language. The meaning of the book as a whole can be formulated approximately as follows: what can be said can be said clearly, what cannot be said should be kept in silence”³².

In other words, we are talking about the boundaries of the expression of thought in the following context: the boundaries of thinking coincide with the boundaries of the language, and the boundaries of the language coincide with the boundaries of the world. Thinking - language - world is the contour of the paradigm of the philosophy made by Wittgenstein, which in reality has not so much logical but rather philosophical and philosophical content. Despite the fact that he declares that it is impossible to “think the unthinkable” and, accordingly, one should keep silent about it, the very fact of his text, which has a verbal form, refuses it.

The essence is that Wittgenstein is not limited to the logical analysis (criticism) of “vague” ethical provisions (which is always done by an ordinary representative of the analytical philosophy), but shows the highest degree of the problem of ethical questioning, which cannot be solved within the framework of the rational philosophy, which has knowingly limited number of means (logical and semantic). He does not stop the ethical discourse, going into “silence”, he creates new proposals (rather ambiguous), which caused one of the most acute and fruitful polemics in the history of philosophy of the XXth century. The heuristic power of Wittgenstein's sentetias is so great that it creates a powerful discourse in which the unsuitability of the analytical methodology for solving (and generally raising) ethical issues becomes evident.

³¹ The researcher notes that “Wittgenstein was deeply concerned with ethical issues – the meaning of life, the nature of good and evil” y L. B. Makeeva, Yazyk, ontologiya i realizm (Moscow: Vysshaya shkola ekonomiki, 2011).

³² L. Vitgenshtejn, “Logiko-filosofskij traktat.” Filosofskie raboty. Part I (Moscow: Gnozis, 1994), 3.

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It is important to mention Wittgenstein's words, said a few years after the Treatise was written, which clarified his position in a more radical and unambiguous way: "The desire to go beyond the boundaries of the language is ethics. I think it is very important that all this chatter about ethics - whether it is known, whether it is valuable, whether it is possible to determine the good - is put to an end. Ethics is constantly trying to express something that is not and will never be consistent with the essence of the things. Apriori makes full admission, that there will always be misunderstandings, no matter what the definition of good we give, because what is really meant cannot be expressed. But the very desire to go beyond the boundaries of the language points to something"³³.

This seems to be the death sentence of ethics; in reality, it is the negation of the possibility of achieving the truth through ethical discourse (which it always does). The analytical philosophy also falls under this denial, because it relies on the language as the supreme dwelling place of truth, which can be reached by means of "purification" (the language criticism) due to the logical analysis. But it is as much an illusion as the opposite - to reach the essence of things through the language.

Wittgenstein offers something radical that does not fit into the methodology of the analytical philosophy. It is meaningless to try to achieve something by means of the language, but it is also meaningless to try to find the "true language" by clearing it of the "vague" positions of metaphysics, that is what that analytical tradition does. P. Campitz explains this intention of Wittgenstein as: "The acceptance of ethics in the silent attitude of loneliness remains an alternative to the modern analytical tendencies of philosophy"³⁴.

Wittgenstein's pathos judgments throw into question the validity of the modern analytical procedures for comprehending the completeness of the ethical reality, which turns out to be unthinkable without an emotional component. For example, this characteristic of the analytical philosophy makes it not quite suitable, in particular, for the analysis of the emotional sphere: "From their point of view, philosophers do not have a special ability (intellectual intuition or mystical feeling) that would allow them to have an access to being; the only tool that they can use in solving any philosophical problems, including metaphysical ones, is the analysis of the language. Only by analyzing our judgments or statements about the world, which we recognize as true, can we get an idea of what kind of objects and essence have real existence. Behind this approach to metaphysical problems is the belief that the most common features of reality are somehow embedded in the overall structure of the language and can be identified in the course of its analysis"³⁵.

In this tradition, there is a reduction to the language, and not just to the language, but to its formal-logical and logical-semantic nature, that is, to its linguistic framework. G. Surl considers that the birth of modern philosophy should be counted on the works of G. Freguet, who made a distinction between the meaning and the reference. In this case, the non-linguistic being of the language as a phenomenon of being itself is left out, and a person finds himself as a philosophically asking creature. So, language issues are not important, but rather the emphasis and significance that the analytical philosophy attaches to the linguistic and logical aspect of language are burning.

³³ P. Kampic, "Hajdegger i Vitgenshtejn: kritika metafiziki – kritika tehnikni – etika", Voprosy filosofii, num 5 (1998): 49.

³⁴ P. Kampic, "Hajdegger i Vitgenshtejn: kritika metafiziki... 55.

³⁵ L. B. Makeeva, Yazyk, ontologiya i realizm (Moscow: Vysshaya shkola ekonomiki, 2011), 5.

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Of course, everything, including the most radical thoughts, are expressed with the help of the language, and we always have the right to ask questions about the logical correctness of the certain proposals. However, when entering the field of philosophy proper, one discovers one's own special relation of philosophy to language³⁶ However, when we enter the field of philosophy itself, we discover our own special attitude to the language. It may seem paradoxical, but the philosophy in some ways ignores the language, concentrating on the thoughts themselves. And how and in what way the thought is born, in essence, is not important. Therefore, the fear and unwillingness of this kind of research is caused by the fact that ethicists are convinced that if we focus too much on the empirical (linguistic) parameters of the language, then the philosophical issues themselves disappear³⁷.

The linguistic and logical problems of the “expression” of emotions in morality

The linguistic observations that we have demonstrated earlier testify to the fact that there are different linguistic ways of transmitting ethical knowledge: “ethical experience and knowledge can be recorded not only directly - in the commandments, imperatives, strictures, requirements and instructions, but also indirectly - in warnings and recommendations - in the implicitly present in phraseological expressions of the language”.³⁸ The boundaries of the transmission of the ethical knowledge can be extended to the most uncanonical forms, since the content of this knowledge forms concepts, which are not part of the rational interpretation. The most researched of them is the concept of “conscience”: as well as emotions, it goes under the heading “irrational in morality”, but in contrast to the emotions it still enjoys greater popularity in attempts at the ethical rationalization. The phenomenon of the conscience in this case is not chosen by chance: many philosophers and researchers note that conscience is a kind of syncretism of the rational and emotional. On the one hand, it is a kind of the indicator, reacting to the non-performance of the moral norm, and, on the other hand, a person feels the emotional experience associated with the change of the certain emotional states.

In this connection, we will present E. Urson's observations on the existence of the concepts of reason and conscience in the language. Investigating the differences between the lexemes “nous”, “sanity”, “intellect” and “mind”, the author notes that mind is associated with the higher ethical concepts (good and evil), while nous is closely connected with the soul and heart. This, in the author's opinion, is one of the differences between the human language model and the psychology, which clearly separates the emotional and rational spheres of the psyche.

Conscience, according to the researcher, is the main essence in a person in

³⁶ The results of the methodological synthesis of logical-philosophical and cognitive-conceptual analysis of texts discussed in the article can serve as the evidence of the validity of this thesis y M. L. Gel'fond; O. N. Mishchuk; M. L. Gel'fond y O. N. Mishchuk, “Ideya nenasiliya: filosofskie i lingvisticheskie aspekty (po rabotam i vystupleniyam M. L. Kinga)”, *Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki*, num 2 (2016): 160-172.

³⁷ K. Vojtyla defines the essence of ethics, distinguishing it from scientific ethics, which is based on the positivist science of morality: “...it is impossible to understand good and evil, that is - not to build ethics without honest reflection about our being and its goals” (K. Vojtyla. *Osnovani etiki, Voprosy filosofii*, num 1 (1991): 30. Put it otherwise, honest reflection, not “logically correct” as linguistic philosophy demands, is the basis for the construction of genuine ethics.

³⁸ N. K. Ryabceva, “Eticheskie znaniya i ih «predmetnoe» voploshchenie”, *Logicheskij analiz yazyka: Yazyki etiki* (Moscow: Ros.Akad.nauk, In-t yazykoznanija), 183.

charge of ethical, moral assessment. On the one hand, conscience as an organ of the ethical and moral assessment is connected with the soul, being a part of it. On the other hand, and this is particularly significant for us, “conscience is partly similar to reason, because it implies the formulation of a quite rational judgment. Conscience is also close to reason in terms of what is associated with the inner voice that instructs the subject”³⁹.

E. Fromm’s analytical notes are also of interest to us: while analyzing philosophical literature related to the problems of conscience, he made such an important generalization: “The emotional side of this knowledge was emphasized by English philosophers. Sheftsbury, for example, admits that a person has a “moral sense”, a sense of justice and injustice, an emotional reaction based on the fact that the human mind itself is in harmony with the cosmic order. Butler assumes that the moral principles are innate to man as a part of his constitution and, in particular, identifies conscience with an innate desire for the good deeds. According to Adam Smith, our feelings for other people and our reaction to their approval or disapproval are the essence of conscience. Kant abstracted conscience from any specific content and identified it with a sense of duty. Nietzsche, a fierce critic of the religious “guilty conscience”, saw a true conscience rooted in self-affirmation, in the ability to say “yes” to yourself. Max Scheler believed that conscience is the expression of the rational judgment, but the judgment of feelings, not the judgment of reason”⁴⁰. “The judgment of feelings”, expressed in conscience, is a synthesis of rational and emotional to a greater extent. N. Arutyunova calls “shame” and “conscience” social-evaluation concepts that regulate a person's attitude to others. It also includes such concepts as shame, opprobrium, disgrace, dignity, fame, honor, etc. Their functions are described as follows:

“Socio-evaluation concepts participate in the mechanisms of the consciousness coordination, as an organ designed most of all to make judgments, and will, as the effective beginning of the person. There is an intermediate zone between consciousness and will. It involves categories in which deontic judgments are combined with volitional impulse or feeling (primarily fear). These include commandments, formulas of law (prohibitions and prescriptions), as well as beliefs, creed, prejudices, ideologies and ideals. Shame and conscience are also among the natural coordinators of consciousness and will”⁴¹.

“The volitional impulse” represents a “judgment of feeling” with an emotional content. Rational-emotional relations can be a research method in the literary criticism that reveals many important features of the emotional sphere and, consequently, the specific language of morality and emotional moral judgment, among others. As noted by V. Shakhovskiy:

“Fiction is a depository of emotions: it describes emotional categorical situations, verbal and nonverbal behavior of a person, ways, means and way of communication of emotions, it captures the emotional specific and individual experience of a person, ways of his emotional reflection. In this regard, all fiction is an invaluable textbook on the education of the culture of the emotional communication of Homo sentiens”⁴².

³⁹ E. V. Uryson, “Golos razuma i golos sovesti”, Logicheskij analiz yazyka: Yazyki etiki (Moscow: Yazyki russkoj kul'tury, 2000), 186-187.

⁴⁰ E. Fromm, Psihoanaliz i etika (Moscow: Respublika, 1993), 115-116.

⁴¹ N. D. Arutyunova, “O styde i sovesti.” Logicheskij analiz yazyka: Yazyki etiki (Moscow: Yazyki russkoj kul'tury, 2000), 57.

⁴² V. I. Shahovskij, Emocii. Dolingvistika, lingvistika, lingvokul'turologiya (Moscow: LIBROKOM, 2010), 115-116.

By the example of the children's fiction (works written by N. Nosov, V. Dragunsky, A. Aleksin, V. Krapivin) L. Dolzhenko in the doctoral study makes important conclusions about the children's emotions, which represent childhood as "a special period in the life of a person", and, moreover, as a "self-sufficient period in the life of a person". The concepts of "rational" and "emotional" correlate with the terms "mind" and "heart". Based on the understanding of artistic creativity as a special form of "emotional thinking"⁴³ (L. Vygotsky), the researcher notes that "the child's emotions play a major role in the development of his mind, in motivating his actions and behavior"⁴⁴. The cognitive aspect of emotions is noted, as well as their moral regulatory function, identified in the literary criticism perspective.

The neurophysiological interpretation of emotions illustrates the cognitive essence of emotions as "the language of superconsciousness", revealing the originality of "judgment of feelings". S. Simonov attributes emotions to the field of the unconscious: "If consciousness is armed with speech, symbols of mathematical formulas and figurative structure of the artistic works, the unconscious mental informs consciousness about the results of its activities by experience of feelings, that is emotions". An emotion itself is interpreted as a complex mental reaction in which there is a significant presence of the cognitive and axiological element. The scientist says that "psychophysiological experiments have led us to the conclusion that the emotion is a reflection of any actual need and probability (possibility) of its satisfaction, which subject evaluates unintentionally and often unconsciously comparing the information about time and resources, which are important for achieving the goal with the information received at the moment. In essence, it is emotion that integrates both principles of Freud's psychology: pleasure and reality"⁴⁵.

The scientist distinguishes three types of emotions – the emotions of beauty, humor and conscience, noting the negative emotional coloring of the voice of conscience. Conscience acts as the language of the emotional response. This is a non-verbal or super-verbal language of morality, which has a well-defined normative function. "Conscience is a person's inherent ability to respond emotionally to the consequences of his or her forecasted or the actual actions, insofar as they affect the satisfaction of two fundamental needs for the objective truth and goodness. In reflexive consciousness, these emotional experiences appear as the ability to moral self-evaluation of their actions regardless of the norms accepted in the social environment of the subject and formed in accordance with these norms of belief"⁴⁶.

Also, the sense of duty is interpreted in the emotional terms: "The need to follow the norms accepted in a given society is emotionally experienced as a sense of duty".

Thus, emotions are the language of superconsciousness, which transmits the most important moral information, which has a direct regulatory impact on a will and actions of a person. This is the cognitive function of emotions, the logic of emotions, rational mechanisms of emotions: as evidenced by the research of neo-sentimental philosophers and empirical psychologists. According to one of the brightest representatives of the first direction R. Solomon (we described his beliefs about emotions in the first part), emotions

⁴³ L. S. Vygotsky. *Psichologiya razvitiya tcheloveka* (Moscow: Eksmo, Smysl, 2005), 34.

⁴⁴ Dolzhenko L. V. *Racional'noe i emocional'noe v russkoj literature 50-80-h godov XX v.* (N. N. Nosov, V. YU. Dragunskij, A.G. Aleksin, V.P. Krapivin: 10.01.01- rus. lit. Avtoref...d-ra.filol.nauk,21 dek.2001 (Volgograd, 2001), 13.

⁴⁵ P. V. Simonov, "Mozg i tvorchestvo", *Voprosy filosofii*, num 11 (1992): 8.

⁴⁶ P. V. Simonov, "Mozg i tvorchestvo... 13.

arise as if a ready-made solution, because they are formed by a special mechanism, and therefore they can be equated to the status of judgments. Many of the actions we take in life are habitual and mechanically perfected, i.e. seemingly unconscious; however, they are the final rationalization of the situations that are already familiar to the person. The same thing is projected on the moral actions - they are voluntary and full of intentions, because otherwise the emotional flow can always be stopped. Thus, a person in the course of accumulation of living moral experience has moral beliefs, and emotions as a reaction to the external situations are moral judgments, appearing as a result of similarity of these situations. Trying to decipher “the emotional language” and assigning it the status of “non-verbal” for the time being, it can be compared with kinesics, “body language”: it has its own perfect mechanism of appearance, as many gestures and movements are familiar and understandable in this or that socio-cultural environment, and one can read and decipher a person’s reaction to the situation using them. What in this case reacts to the external circumstances? Or many reactions never reach the level of consciousness and therefore cannot be reflected in them?

The “musical” metaphor of morality suggested by I. Kravchenko is interesting. He explains the instrumental function of expressing the phenomena of emotions and feelings. He quotes: “Morality in a sense is similar to music - it exists “virtually”, in ideals and principles, and sounds only with the help of instruments of another, non-moral nature, in feelings and consciousness of a person, and if he is receptive to it”.⁴⁷ This means that the possibilities of verbal (and non-verbal) expression of moral judgments are limitless.

It can be assumed that “the judgment of feelings” is mainly related to the sensualist tradition, incorporates the features of a true moral judgment because it synthesizes the emotional and rational aspects and presents them in unity. Therefore, it is quite difficult to determine what is more important in a deed: emotional or rational.

To answer this question, it is necessary to reproduce the verbal structure of the ethical act described by Bakhtin and to isolate the emotional component. He explains: “To express an action from the inside, we need the entirety of the word: its content and meaning (word-concept), and visual and expressive (word image), and emotional and volitional (intonation of the word) in their unity. And in all these moments a single full word can be responsibly significant - the truth, and not subjectively accidental”⁴⁸. Thus, the three components - the content-semantic, visually-expressive and emotionally-volitional side form the semantic unity of the deed.

The latter one is a universal model of morality, accumulating in its existential representation the immanent properties of rationality and emotion, on the basis of which the unity of the internal motive, external action, as well as the verbally expressed and emotionally experienced moral assessment and self-esteem of the subject are formed. Consequently, by verbalizing our moral experiences, we recreate that missing element of the “three-dimensional” projection of morality, the presence of which allows us to reconstruct its “three-dimensional” model, which connects its rational, emotional and active components.

⁴⁷ I. I. Kravchenko, “Politika i moral” Voprosy filosofii, num 3 (1995): 3.

⁴⁸ M. M. Bahtin, “K filosofii postupka”, Raboty 20-h godov (Kiev: Next, 1994), 34.

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