



REVISTA INCLUSIONES

HOMENAJE A MAJA ZAWIERZENIEC

Revista de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales

Volumen 7 . Número Especial

Abril / Junio

2020

ISSN 0719-4706

CUERPO DIRECTIVO

Directores

Dr. Juan Guillermo Mansilla Sepúlveda

Universidad Católica de Temuco, Chile

Dr. Francisco Ganga Contreras

Universidad de Tarapacá, Chile

Subdirectores

Mg © Carolina Cabezas Cáceres

Universidad de Las Américas, Chile

Dr. Andrea Mutolo

Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México, México

Editor

Drdo. Juan Guillermo Estay Sepúlveda

Editorial Cuadernos de Sofía, Chile

Editor Científico

Dr. Luiz Alberto David Araujo

Pontificia Universidade Católica de Sao Paulo, Brasil

Editor Brasil

Drdo. Maicon Herverton Lino Ferreira da Silva

Universidade da Pernambuco, Brasil

Editor Europa del Este

Dr. Aleksandar Ivanov Katrandzhiev

Universidad Suroeste "Neofit Rilski", Bulgaria

Cuerpo Asistente

Traductora: Inglés

Lic. Pauline Corthorn Escudero

Editorial Cuadernos de Sofía, Chile

Traductora: Portugués

Lic. Elaine Cristina Pereira Menegón

Editorial Cuadernos de Sofía, Chile

Portada

Lic. Graciela Pantigoso de Los Santos

Editorial Cuadernos de Sofía, Chile

COMITÉ EDITORIAL

Dra. Carolina Aroca Toloza

Universidad de Chile, Chile

Dr. Jaime Bassa Mercado

Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile

Dra. Heloísa Bellotto

Universidad de Sao Paulo, Brasil

Dra. Nidia Burgos

Universidad Nacional del Sur, Argentina

Mg. María Eugenia Campos

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dr. Francisco José Francisco Carrera

Universidad de Valladolid, España

Mg. Keri González

Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México, México

Dr. Pablo Guadarrama González

Universidad Central de Las Villas, Cuba

Mg. Amelia Herrera Lavanchy

Universidad de La Serena, Chile

Mg. Cecilia Jofré Muñoz

Universidad San Sebastián, Chile

Mg. Mario Lagomarsino Montoya

Universidad Adventista de Chile, Chile

Dr. Claudio Llanos Reyes

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile

Dr. Werner Mackenbach

Universidad de Potsdam, Alemania

Universidad de Costa Rica, Costa Rica

Mg. Rocío del Pilar Martínez Marín

Universidad de Santander, Colombia

Ph. D. Natalia Milanesio

Universidad de Houston, Estados Unidos

Dra. Patricia Virginia Moggia Münchmeyer

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile

Ph. D. Maritza Montero

Universidad Central de Venezuela, Venezuela

Dra. Eleonora Pencheva

Universidad Suroeste Neofit Rilski, Bulgaria

Dra. Rosa María Regueiro Ferreira

Universidad de La Coruña, España

Mg. David Ruete Zúñiga

Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello, Chile

Dr. Andrés Saavedra Barahona

Universidad San Clemente de Ojrid de Sofía, Bulgaria

Dr. Efraín Sánchez Cabra
Academia Colombiana de Historia, Colombia

Dra. Mirka Seitz
Universidad del Salvador, Argentina

Ph. D. Stefan Todorov Kapralov
South West University, Bulgaria

COMITÉ CIENTÍFICO INTERNACIONAL

Comité Científico Internacional de Honor

Dr. Adolfo A. Abadía
Universidad ICESI, Colombia

Dr. Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dr. Martino Contu
Universidad de Sassari, Italia

Dr. Luiz Alberto David Araujo
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Sao Paulo, Brasil

Dra. Patricia Brogna
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dr. Horacio Capel Sáez
Universidad de Barcelona, España

Dr. Javier Carreón Guillén
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dr. Lancelot Cowie
Universidad West Indies, Trinidad y Tobago

Dra. Isabel Cruz Ovalle de Amenabar
Universidad de Los Andes, Chile

Dr. Rodolfo Cruz Vadillo
Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, México

Dr. Adolfo Omar Cueto
Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina

Dr. Miguel Ángel de Marco
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dra. Emma de Ramón Acevedo
Universidad de Chile, Chile

Dr. Gerardo Echeita Sarrionandia
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, España

Dr. Antonio Hermosa Andújar
Universidad de Sevilla, España

Dra. Patricia Galeana
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dra. Manuela Garau
Centro Studi Sea, Italia

Dr. Carlo Ginzburg Ginzburg
Scuola Normale Superiore de Pisa, Italia
Universidad de California Los Ángeles, Estados Unidos

Dr. Francisco Luis Girardo Gutiérrez
Instituto Tecnológico Metropolitano, Colombia

José Manuel González Freire
Universidad de Colima, México

Dra. Antonia Heredia Herrera
Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, España

Dr. Eduardo Gomes Onofre
Universidade Estadual da Paraíba, Brasil

Dr. Miguel León-Portilla
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dr. Miguel Ángel Mateo Saura
Instituto de Estudios Albacetenses "Don Juan Manuel", España

Dr. Carlos Tulio da Silva Medeiros
Diálogos em MERCOSUR, Brasil

+ Dr. Álvaro Márquez-Fernández
Universidad del Zulia, Venezuela

Dr. Oscar Ortega Arango
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán, México

Dr. Antonio-Carlos Pereira Menaut
Universidad Santiago de Compostela, España

Dr. José Sergio Puig Espinosa
Dilemas Contemporáneos, México

Dra. Francesca Randazzo
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Honduras

Dra. Yolando Ricardo

Universidad de La Habana, Cuba

Dr. Manuel Alves da Rocha

Universidade Católica de Angola Angola

Mg. Arnaldo Rodríguez Espinoza

Universidad Estatal a Distancia, Costa Rica

Dr. Miguel Rojas Mix

*Coordinador la Cumbre de Rectores Universidades
Estatales América Latina y el Caribe*

Dr. Luis Alberto Romero

CONICET / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dra. Maura de la Caridad Salabarría Roig

Dilemas Contemporáneos, México

Dr. Adalberto Santana Hernández

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Dr. Juan Antonio Seda

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dr. Saulo Cesar Paulino e Silva

Universidad de Sao Paulo, Brasil

Dr. Miguel Ángel Verdugo Alonso

Universidad de Salamanca, España

Dr. Josep Vives Rego

Universidad de Barcelona, España

Dr. Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dra. Blanca Estela Zardel Jacobo

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Comité Científico Internacional

Mg. Paola Aceituno

Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana, Chile

Ph. D. María José Aguilar Idañez

Universidad Castilla-La Mancha, España

Dra. Elian Araujo

Universidad de Mackenzie, Brasil

Mg. Rumyana Atanasova Popova

Universidad Suroeste Neofit Rilski, Bulgaria

Dra. Ana Bénard da Costa

Instituto Universitario de Lisboa, Portugal

Centro de Estudos Africanos, Portugal

Dra. Alina Bestard Revilla

*Universidad de Ciencias de la Cultura Física y el
Deporte, Cuba*

Dra. Noemí Brenta

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Ph. D. Juan R. Coca

Universidad de Valladolid, España

Dr. Antonio Colomer Vialdel

Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, España

Dr. Christian Daniel Cwik

Universidad de Colonia, Alemania

Dr. Eric de Léséulec

INS HEA, Francia

Dr. Andrés Di Masso Tarditti

Universidad de Barcelona, España

Ph. D. Mauricio Dimant

Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, Israel

Dr. Jorge Enrique Elías Caro

Universidad de Magdalena, Colombia

Dra. Claudia Lorena Fonseca

Universidad Federal de Pelotas, Brasil

Dra. Ada Gallegos Ruiz Conejo

Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Perú

Dra. Carmen González y González de Mesa

Universidad de Oviedo, España

Ph. D. Valentin Kitanov

Universidad Suroeste Neofit Rilski, Bulgaria

Mg. Luis Oporto Ordóñez

Universidad Mayor San Andrés, Bolivia

Dr. Patricio Quiroga

Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile

Dr. Gino Ríos Patio

Universidad de San Martín de Porres, Perú

**REVISTA
INCLUSIONES**
REVISTA DE HUMANIDADES
Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES

Dr. Carlos Manuel Rodríguez Arrechavaleta
Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México, México

Dra. Vivian Romeu
Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México, México

Dra. María Laura Salinas
Universidad Nacional del Nordeste, Argentina

Dr. Stefano Santasilia
Universidad della Calabria, Italia

Mg. Silvia Laura Vargas López
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, México

**CUADERNOS DE SOFÍA
EDITORIAL**

Dra. Jaqueline Vassallo
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina

Dr. Evandro Viera Ouriques
Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro, Brasil

Dra. María Luisa Zagalaz Sánchez
Universidad de Jaén, España

Dra. Maja Zawierzeniec
Universidad Wszechnica Polska, Polonia

Editorial Cuadernos de Sofía
Santiago – Chile
Representante Legal
Juan Guillermo Estay Sepúlveda Editorial

Indización, Repositorios y Bases de Datos Académicas

Revista Inclusiones, se encuentra indizada en:





REX



UNIVERSITY OF
SASKATCHEWAN



Universidad
de Concepción

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSIDAD DE CONCEPCIÓN



**INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 AND THE EVOLUTION
OF ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II**

Dr. Vera Vladimirovna Malay

Belgorod State University, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0001-5699-4989

malay_v@bsu.edu.ru

Dr. (C) Svetlana Yurievna Krupskaya

Belgorod State University, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0002-4850-9573

krupskaya@bsu.edu.ru

Ph. D. (C) Olga Alexeevna Timoshkova

Belgorod State University, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0003-4087-6843

timoshkova@bsu.edu.ru

Dr. (C) Nickolay Nickolaevich Fomichev

Belgorod State University, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0002-7166-7553

fomichev@bsu.edu.ru

Dr. (C) Marina Sergeevna Orechova

Belgorod State University, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0002-0744-0258

orechova@bsu.edu.ru

Fecha de Recepción: 13 de enero de 2020 – **Fecha Revisión:** 27 de enero de 2020

Fecha de Aceptación: 02 de marzo de 2020 – **Fecha de Publicación:** 01 de abril de 2020

Abstract

The article, based on an analysis of British foreign policy documents and materials of the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, examines Anglo-German relations in the second half of the 1930s. It reveals how official London in the context of the internationalization of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 built its relations with Berlin, which has failed to achieve in bilateral and international relations and why.

Keywords

Spanish Civil War – 1936-1939 – The policy of Non-intervention – Anglo-German relations

Para Citar este Artículo:

Malay, Vera Vladimirovna; Krupskaya, Svetlana Yurievna; Timoshkova, Olga Alexeevna; Fomichev, Nickolay Nickolaevich y Orechova, Marina Sergeevna. International aspects of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 and the evolution of Anglo-German relations on the eve of World War II. Revista Inclusiones Vol: 7 num Especial (2020): 01-11.

Licencia Creative Commons Attribution Non-Comercial 3.0 Unported
(CC BY-NC 3.0)

Licencia Internacional



Introduction

The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 stands out among the dramas of modern times. The plans of the Spanish political reaction, which revolted an uprising against the government of the Popular Front in July 1936, were frustrated by the remaining military units loyal to the Republicans and armed militia. With relative equality of arms, the rebellion escalated into a Civil War.

In Europe, the second half of the 1930s, in an atmosphere of acute political and ideological polarization, a local conflict (all the more, with a pronounced anti- or pro-fascist context) could not preserve only its internal content. The basis for its internationalization was the appeal in July 1936 for foreign assistance: first, the Republic asked France, and a little later the rebels asked the governments of Italy and Germany. The proclamation by the leading European states of the policy of Non-intervention (August 1936) can be considered another factor in the internationalization of the Spanish Civil War. The beginning of Soviet military assistance to the Spanish Republic (early October 1936) marked the next stage.

The globalization of the Spanish problem has had a significant impact on relations between the leading European countries. The multifaceted struggle over the Spanish Civil war did not contribute to the solution of the Spanish question, nor to the mitigation of the problems of the pre-war crisis.

In the second half of the 1930s, relations with Nazi Germany were one of the priorities of the European strategy for Great Britain. The rapid and profound internationalization of the Spanish civil war became an important international problem in the context of which Britain had to construct relations with Germany as well. It extended to the policy of Non-intervention in Spanish Affairs and to Anglo-German bilateral relations proper.

Methods

The research methodology of the study is based on the principle of historicism. The paper also used the principle of objectivity, which assumes that historical reality is objective, sources and facts have objective content and historical comprehension, which allows to recreate the historical picture of the past. The realization of this research would not have been possible without the use of a set of various general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction) and special methods of historical science: historical and genetic method, which allowed to see Anglo-German relations in the connection of international aspects of the Spanish Civil War; comparative-historical, which helped to examine and compare two political views to the Spanish problems; problem-chronological, used to divide the studied problem into a number of smaller ones; descriptive-narrative, applied to the disclosure of the historical context of the period under consideration.

Results and discussion

The conflict in Spain immediately followed an acutely confrontational scenario. Italy and Germany quickly defined their attitude towards the Spanish drama, interfering in the

summer of 1936, and supporting the rebels. France and Great Britain considered the "neutral" position to be the best option - non-interference.

In the notion of localization of the conflict, in addition to limiting its framework, England, like France, included the tasks of maintaining and strengthening its position, both behind the Pyrenees and in Europe as a whole, and Italy with Germany - their expansion. According to British diplomacy and intelligence, the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were most interested in the Spanish adventure of the German ruling circles. German politics represented hardly the most "pragmatic reading of the Spanish situation"¹.

To be sure, European leaders were aware that "Spanish events created a large number of complications and conflicts in Europe"². But the understanding of the forms and methods of achieving localization of the Spanish conflict among the leading participants of the policy of "non-intervention" did not coincide. Germany and Italy, for the speedy conclusion of the war, sided with the rebels. Official London and Paris did not openly support any side, but the sympathies of the British cabinet gradually crystallized in the direction of the Francists.

The head of the British Foreign Ministry, A. Eden, with the beginning of Spanish events has repeatedly stated that one of the main dangerous consequences of the war on the Pyrenean Peninsula was the possible division of Europe into two opposing camps. British task was to prevent such a development³.

Official Berlin, in its rhetoric, immediately outlined and greatly confused the ideological aspect of armed confrontation in Spain. The concern of the Reich leadership about the spread of left-wing currents in connection with Spanish events has been repeatedly confirmed by British diplomats⁴. The Soviet ambassador in Germany Y. Suritz reported to Moscow in early of August, 1936 that "Germany did not hide the definitely hostile attitude towards us and more and more openly put a break with us a condition of rapprochement with it"⁵. At the beginning of the war in Spain, the leadership of the Foreign Ministry did not reject the possibility of using anti-communism as one of the starting points for dialogue with Germany. In mid-August 1936 R. Vansittart, on the results of its trip in Berlin, noted that Hitler, despite all his fanatical rejection of communism and the USSR, was a politician, versed soberly in the subtleties of the current international situation⁶. The UK's deputy Secretary for Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that he and ambassador to Berlin Phipps had generally prepared the ground for further talks with Germany - the German leadership's stereotypes of the British Foreign Office anti-German prejudice were dispelled⁷.

¹ G. Esenwein y A. Shubert, Spain at War. The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939 (N.Y.: Addison-Wesley Longman Ltda, 1995).

² Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 96-97.

³ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 25 y Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR (DFP USSR), Moscow, Russia, Vol. 19: 679-680.

⁴ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 097, record series 11, file 14: 133 y Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 58: 64; doc. 63: 67.

⁵ DFP USSR, Moscow, Russia, vol. 19: 389.

⁶ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 097, record series 11, file 14: 132-133.

⁷ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 85: 92.

Despite the readiness for dialogue with Nazi leaders, the British leadership was alarmed by Germany's foreign policy aspirations, voiced by the NSDAP leadership at the party Congress in Nuremberg (September 1936): demands to return German colonies, to change the system of international relations that infringes the Reich⁸. The British press unanimously stated Germany's destructive role in international life. *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Herald*, *News Chronicle* wrote that official Berlin was the main potential aggressor in Europe, and opposed German attempts to isolate the USSR from participation in the international security system. Even the conservative *The Times* claimed that England should not stop the spread of communism to ensure the supremacy of fascism on the continent⁹. Conversations of Soviet diplomats with British politicians and public figures during the autumn of 1936 showed that fears of the growing power of the fascist Reich reinforced anti-German sentiment in England¹⁰.

The main goal of the British diplomacy concerning Germany as the French ambassador in Berlin A. François-Ponce fairly noticed, was to achieve from the Reich of the obligation not to break stability in Europe¹¹. In Vansittart's letter to Eden (on September 21) there was an idea that Great Britain would not begin to consider major for the Reich the question of return of the German colonies until the English leaders are sure "concerning receiving something very real and material in exchange"¹². Eden's internal Protocol of November 4 was more specific: Britain should induce Berlin to change of a political course in Europe. Without reservation of political conditions it was possible to provoke acceleration of rates of Reich's rearmament and increasing its expansion in Central and South-East Europe¹³. After the famous negotiations between Ciano and Hitler of October 1936, which started the Berlin-Rome Axis, Berlin used a traditional tactical move: Ministry of Foreign Affairs' officials were obliged to convey to all interested foreign political circles the idea of the inviolability for Germany of Spain's territorial indivisibility¹⁴. Eden's speech in Parliament on November 5, 1936 was to outline the contours of future cooperation between London and Berlin: this friendship could not be exceptional; secondly, it could not be directed against anyone¹⁵. Two weeks later, the head of the English Foreign Ministry said that Britain was ready for an agreement with Germany if it at least partially renounced its policy of weapons and aggressive intentions¹⁶. At the end of 1936, the process of normalization of German-British relations was mothballed due to a significant divergence of positions on leading European problems, including the Spanish question. British diplomacy switched to preparation the famous "Gentlemen's agreement" with Italy. During November 1936 - January 1937, Germany continued to focus London's attention on the fact that the position of the Reich in Spain was determined solely by the fear of establishing a communist regime on the Iberian Peninsula, and the victory of the rebels will also be in the interests of Great Britain¹⁷.

⁸ DFP USSR, Moscow, Russia, vol. 19: 422-426.

⁹ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 69, record series 24, file 5: 124.

¹⁰ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 69, record series 24, file 5: 102-103.

¹¹ Documents Diplomatiques français (DDF), France, Paris, 1932-1939, 2^e ser., vol. 5, doc. 51: 76-78.

¹² DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 220: 303.

¹³ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 350: 498.

¹⁴ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 082, record series 19, file 4: 117-118, 125, 129-130.

¹⁵ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 24.

¹⁶ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 25, file 11: 38.

¹⁷ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 24.

Berlin's foreign policy was ambiguously evaluated by the Foreign Office. On December 23, 1936 E. Phipps expressed the opinion that that Germany had by then realized that the brilliant period of its bloodless victories, as a result of violations of the Non-intervention Agreement in the affairs of Spain, was over. The British diplomat was sure that Hitler in the future will not risk to attack the rearmed Britain¹⁸. However, an employee of the Foreign Office O. Sargent (December 29) gave a negative evaluation to the results of German diplomacy activities due to many factors: the prolongation of the Spanish conflict which threatened to Hitler by engaging in a dangerous military adventure; unresolved colonial question; some deviations Italy from the "Axis" course (preparation agreement with Britain). In this regard, Sargent, in contrast to Phipps, believed that the "final brilliant period of bloodless victories" of Germany would not promise England an improvement in the international situation as Berlin in the light of these foreign policy failures would seek diplomatic, and not only successes¹⁹. According to the correct observation of the Soviet Ambassador in London Maisky, by the end of December 1936, Britain decided to wait for further development of the situation in Spain, in order to determine its position against Germany taking into account this factor²⁰.

The difficulty of forecasting the British Foreign office further foreign policy strategy of Nazism was exacerbated by the receipt information from its representatives in Berlin in early January 1937, according to which, the foreign policy of the Reich could undergo significant change. Eden in the beginning of 1937 sagaciously called Spain, Memel, Danzig, Czechoslovakia the most dangerous points on the map of pre-war Europe: "If the German attention is not fixed on Spain, it would be very difficult to restrain the aggression of this country in any of the other three directions". From this conclusion the tactical disposition followed to be complaisant on the Spanish question, in order to gain as much time as possible (in Europe) and to maintain their dominance in colonial and Maritime spaces²¹.

In connection with serious economic difficulties, in the German leadership it was allegedly expressed the opinion that it was necessary to limit Nazi participation in the Spanish conflict - otherwise, the implementation of a 4-year (1936-1940) development plan for the German economy would be threatened. In addition, Hitler's decision to stop aid to Franco was affected by the protracted nature of hostilities and considerations of the General staff, which pointed to Germany's unpreparedness for a European war in the event of an extreme aggravation of contradictions between States with their interests in the Iberian Peninsula²².

Hitler's speech on January 30, 1937 virtually erased the hopes of Baldwin Cabinet in the near future to reach an agreement with the German leadership. The Führer made it clear that Germany would not make any concessions in order to achieve stability in Europe²³. In mid-February, the Reich Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels confirmed this

¹⁸ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 503: 721-722.

¹⁹ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 521: 743.

²⁰ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 060, record series 21, file 4: 30-33.

²¹ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 32: 38 y AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 161.

²² DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 8: 7-8; doc. 17: 17; doc. 53: 70-72; doc. 59: 80; doc. 72: 95-96.

²³ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 69, record series 25, file 11, p.39; Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 37-38.

foreign policy, saying that the Reich did not want a European war, but will not allow the strengthening of Bolshevism on the continent. Commenting on London's efforts to maintain Non-intervention in Spain and achieve stability in Europe, Goebbels said: "Eden is like a child asking for Christmas presents that cannot be found"²⁴.

One of England's important tactics in dealing with Germany and Italy against the background of the Spanish conflict was to exploit the differences between them and contribute as much as possible to their divergence. The opinion about the temporary nature of the Italo-German rapprochement was expressed in the Foreign Office at the very beginning of the Spanish events: Ingram in an interview with the Soviet charge d'affaires in Rome Gelfand (12 August 1936) stated that both Hitler and Mussolini did not intend seriously to associate their political future with each other. But maintaining the appearance of rapprochement gave dictators the opportunity to maneuver in relations with other European countries²⁵. This belief of the English Foreign Office was fueled by Italian and German diplomats²⁶.

5 November 1936, after the signing of the Italy-German agreement and the formation of "Axis" Berlin – Rome, Grandi, a supporter of cooperation between Italy and England, expressed personal opinion to Vansittart: the policy of Mussolini government, aimed at whipping up the English-Italian hostility that was beneficial to the third party, Germany²⁷. According to Soviet diplomats, the German foreign Ministry also assured London of the opportunistic nature of its rapprochement with Italy and of its readiness to abandon it in case of friendly steps on the part of England. Moreover, Soviet diplomacy reinforced the Foreign Office's vision of the Axis as an instrument of pressure on the British government, believing that the Italo-German agreement was only a facade, and it would not withstand the clash of interests of these States in Central Europe²⁸.

The result of this diplomatic game was a certain conviction of the British Foreign Office that it was possible to take advantage of the contradictions between Germany and Italy and to divide the regimes. On the eve of the signing of the "Gentlemen's agreement," Vansittart believed that the veiled line to separate Rome from Berlin should be continued in order to deal with a "more reasonable Germany" in the future. Eden agreed with this tactical attitude²⁹.

The subsequent activation of Italy in the Spanish question did not change fundamentally this attitude of the British government. By mid-April 1937, the leadership of the Foreign Office (Eden, Vansittart, Mounsey) considered the union of dictators as primarily, an instrument of pressure on democratic European states, used by both Hitler and Mussolini. It was assumed that the tactics of maneuvering between Berlin and Rome would bring England maximum benefits in the international arena³⁰.

²⁴ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 176: 232-233.

²⁵ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 098, record series 19, file 658: 116-119.

²⁶ DDF, France, Paris, 2^e sér., vol. 3, doc. 323: 483.

²⁷ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 353: 516-517.

²⁸ DFP USSR, Moscow, Russia, vol. 19: 579 y DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 516: 735-736.

²⁹ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 527: 751-752.

³⁰ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, Doc. 376, note 1, p. 571; doc. 399: 613-617.

But in the first half of 1937, this course demonstrated its ineffectiveness: as Italy's intervention in Spanish events increased, especially after its defeat at Guadalajara (March 1937), Rome's dependence on diplomatic and political support for Berlin grew. Baldwin's government failed to weaken Italian-German relations, despite the fact that both dictatorial States, albeit in varying degrees, but were interested in cooperation with England.

The relatively low activity of Germany in the Spanish question in the spring of 1937 was reflected in the review of German foreign policy, compiled on April 13 by E. Phipps. Ambassador in Berlin, who transferred his powers to N. Henderson, stated that in the first years of the Nazis in power, Hitler in the field of international relations gave priority to the process of normalization of relations with England. However, the growth of German-British contradictions (primarily on the colonial question) and the lack of principled London in the application of sanctions against Italy after the aggression in Abyssinia slightly reduced the prestige of Britain in the views of the German leadership. Phipps concluded that "relations between London and Berlin were now spoiled", and as the main directions of German foreign policy identified: the Anschluss of Austria and other German-speaking territories (Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia); expansion in Eastern Europe; the return of the German colonies³¹.

On May 10, 1937, the new British ambassador to Berlin, N. Henderson, outlined his vision of Anglo-German relations: partnerships with Germany were beneficial for Britain from the standpoint of opposing both the growing influence of the USSR in the Middle East and Asia, and Italy's clear desire to change the existing alignment forces in the Mediterranean. However, at that time the obstacles to rapprochement between Berlin and London were practically insurmountable. The Anglo-German agreement, giving Hitler freedom of action in his priority areas - Central and Eastern Europe, would meet fierce resistance from the British public and the opposition of other states³².

Despite the desire of London to maintain a "balance of interests", some rapprochement with Nazi Germany at that time was beneficial both from the point of view of resolving the situation in Spain and from the standpoint of playing on the contradictions between the powers of the "Axis".

By the end of 1937, the appeasement of dictatorial powers, which had become the basis of British foreign policy, had a tangible effect on other areas of the Foreign Office, including on the Spanish problem: the British leadership set the priority task of their actions in the arena to find ways of rapprochement with Germany and Italy.

The position of the Reich on the Spanish question, in particular, its limited intervention in the Spanish Civil War in comparison with Italy, gave the British politicians some reason to expect that there would be no really serious contradictions between London and Berlin on this painful issue. For the Chamberlain government at the end of 1937, it seemed more appropriate to make concessions to Hitler, whose foreign policy ambitions were aimed primarily at Central and Eastern Europe than Mussolini, who claimed to change the status quo in the Mediterranean.

³¹ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 399: 613-617.

³² DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 19, doc. 53, Enc. 1: 100-104.

Ribbentrop, who became German Foreign Minister in February 1938, more actively pursued a course towards rapprochement with Italy. According to Maisky I.M. (January 1937), Ribbentrop, being the German ambassador to London, "showed himself to be a man who completely did not understand and did not know Great Britain"³³. "The Ribbentrop line is the strengthening of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and the weakening of London-Berlin contacts, an even more aggressive policy in Central Europe (Czechoslovakia, Austria) and, most importantly, the intensification of intervention in Spain," the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin. J. Suritz rightly considered³⁴.

As it is known, by September 1938 the situation around Czechoslovakia had as a result the Munich Agreement. It became obvious that Chamberlain government's attempts to achieve goals in a policy of appeasement through Non-intervention in Spanish affairs, through compromises with the Nazi and fascist regimes, were unsuccessful. British concessions have led to the fact that the course of Non-intervention has exhausted itself.

Chamberlain stated in Parliament on November 2 that during the Munich meeting, Mussolini and Hitler personally assured him that they had no territorial claims in Spain^{35, 36}.

The attempts of the German leadership to use the "communist threat" factor, which became especially relevant with the beginning of the Spanish events, for rapprochement between Berlin and London were unsuccessful. Firstly, England did not want the division of Europe into opposing ideological camps to contribute to the onset of continental conflict. Secondly, the aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign policy plans became more and more obvious, as noted above; the German-British contradictions were aggravated (primarily on the colonial issue). If the international aspects of the Spanish problem became the determining factor in the complication of Italian-British relations, in the violation of the constructive dialogue with the Reich they were more indirect. In mid-April 1937, Vansittart declared: "If Germany's foreign policy goals were reasonable and legitimate, it would be foolish to hinder it. The problem is that all German goals are unreasonable and illegitimate"³⁷.

Since mid-1937, the German leadership minimized interference in Spanish events, reducing it only to the actions of a limited military contingent and giving Italian diplomacy the initiative in conducting tactical struggle in the London Committee on Non-Intervention in Spain.

Conclusions

Germany and Italy, of course, won by excluding Franco from the number of potential allies of England, and France in 1936-1938. But this strategic gain was short-lived. In September 1938, at the height of the Munich crisis, Franco, contrary to the expectations of Berlin and Rome, declared Spanish neutrality in the event of war. Proving the need to strengthen the Union, Hitler and Mussolini have encouraged Franco to join to the Anti-Comintern Pact in March 1939.

³³ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4: 29.

³⁴ AVP RF, Moscow, Russia, Fund 011, record series 2, file 165: 53.

³⁵ DDF, France, Paris, 2^e ser., vol. 12, doc. 247: 425-426.

³⁶ DBFP, France, Paris, 3rd ser., vol. 3, doc. 358: 343-344.

³⁷ DBFP, London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 396: 609-611.

Thus, England and France were deprived of the guaranteed neutral position of Spain in the impending war. But in August 1939 Caudillo reaffirmed his intention to remain neutral, which was perfectly justified from the point of view of the national interests of the country ravaged by deep civil conflict.

Thus, the result of the UK's implementation of the policy of Non-Intervention was not only contributing to the death of the Spanish Republic, but also the growing confidence of the Axis powers in the possibility of achieving their goals in Spain and in Europe as such. As stated on February 19, 1939, M. M. Litvinov in an conversation with the British ambassador in Moscow, W. Seeds, "Hitler and Mussolini are as scared of the war [future] as you are, only now they know from experience that you will never fight".

References

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 011, record series 2, file 165.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 060, record series 21, file 4.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 21, file 4.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 069, record series 25, file 11.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 082, record series 19, file 4.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 097, record series 11, file 14.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 098, record series 19, file 658.

Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Russia, Fund 69, record series 24, file 5.

DBFP, France, Paris, 3rd ser., vol. 3, doc. 358, pp: 343-344.

Documents Diplomatiques français (DDF), France, Paris, 1932-1939, 2^e ser., vol. 5, doc. 51, pp: 76-78.

Documents Diplomatiques français (DDF), France, Paris, 2^e sér., vol. 3, doc. 323, p. 483.

Documents Diplomatiques français (DDF), France, Paris, 2^e sér., vol. XII, doc. 247, pp: 425-426.

- Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR (DFP USSR), Moscow, Russia, vol. 19.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 220.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 350.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 353.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, Doc. 376, note 1; doc. 399.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 503.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 521.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 527.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 85.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 176.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 32.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 396.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 399.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 18, doc. 8; doc. 17; doc. 53; doc. 59; doc. 72.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 19, doc. 53, Enc. 1.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 516.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), London, England, 2nd ser., vol. 17, doc. 58; doc. 63.
- Esenwein, G. y Shubert, A. Spain at War. The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939. N.Y.: Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd. 1995.

CUADERNOS DE SOFÍA

EDITORIAL

Las opiniones, análisis y conclusiones del autor son de su responsabilidad y no necesariamente reflejan el pensamiento de **Revista Inclusiones**.

La reproducción parcial y/o total de este artículo debe hacerse con permiso de **Revista Inclusiones**.